FRONTLINE 1813 'War inEurope,' Part 2Air date: February 29, 2000War in EuropePart Two: The Real WarProduced by Michael Kirk, Eamonn Matthews, RickYoungWritten by Peter J. BoyerMichael Kirk and Rick YoungPeter J. Boyer, CorrespondentANNOUNCER: Tonight on FRONTLINE:Gen. WESLEY CLARK, Supreme Allied Cmdr. NATO: This wasa mission that was do or die for NATO.ANNOUNCER: Part 2 of the inside story of the war onKosovo.TONY BLAIR, British Prime Minister: Milosevic had toknow that we were prepared to do whatever it took to win.ANNOUNCER: Behind the scenes, there was another warbetween the imperatives of military violence-Gen.
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SHORT, Allied Air Force Cmdr.: You goafter the head of the snake. You put a dagger in the heart of theadversary.ANNOUNCER: -and the imperatives of NATOpolitics.Gen. SHORT: No single target was moreimportant than maintaining the consensus of NATO.ANNOUNCER: It was an air war hamstrung by politics andits own deadly mistakes.Gen. SHORT: General Clark called me directand said, 'Mike, you've hit the Chinese embassy.' ANNOUNCER: The failures of the air war would forcePresident Clinton to face the one decision he had desperately tried to avoid, tosend American troops into a bloody ground war.IVO DAALDER, NSC Dir. European Affairs ('95-'97): Youlose this war, NATO is ended. The credibility of American foreign policy is atan end.ANNOUNCER: Tonight the dramatic conclusion of Warin Europe.NARRATOR: It could be said that the war in Europebegan in Washington, here in the office of the secretary of state.
MadeleineAlbright believed that America had the opportunity and the obligation toexercise power with moral purpose. Her doctrine of 'virtuous power' was beingtested in the most vexing corner of Europe, the Balkans.In early 1998, fighting had erupted in Kosovo, a province ofthe disintegrating Yugoslavia. In that place of ancient trouble, ethnicAlbanians and their Serbian rulers both claimed title to a land that each heldsacred. The Kosovar Albanians, resisting Serb oppression, turned to a band ofinsurgents call the Kosovo Liberation Army, the KLA. Their armed insurrectionbrought violent retribution from the most ruthless man in Europe, Serbian leaderSlobodan Milosevic.For Madeleine Albright, there was only one way to deal with abully like Milosevic.MADELEINE ALBRIGHT, Secretary of State: I believe thatMilosevic is the source of the problem. We all knew that he best understood theuse of force, that unless you're prepared to use force or have the threat of theuse of force, it's difficult to deal with someone who only understandsforce.NARRATOR: Western diplomats would repeatedly threatento bomb Milosevic, but he never seemed to believe them.Amb. RICHARD HOLBROOKE, Special Envoy - Balkans:Milosevic said to me at one point, 'Are you crazy enough to bomb us over theseissues we're talking about in that lousy little Kosovo?'
And I said, 'You bet.We're just crazy enough to do it.' NARRATOR: Finally, on March 24th, 1999, NATO launchedits bombers.Pres. BILL CLINTON: television address Myfellow Americans, today our armed forces joined our NATO allies in air strikesagainst Serbian forces responsible for the brutality in Kosovo.NARRATOR: The president reassured America that thiswould be no Vietnam, promising not to send ground troops.Pres.
BILL CLINTON: television address But Ido not intend to put our troops in Kosovo to fight a war.NARRATOR: A brief bombing campaign, the politiciansbelieved, would back Milosevic down.Gen. SHORT, Allied Air Force Cmdr.: I can'ttell you how many times the instruction I got was, 'Mike, you're only going tobe allowed to bomb two, maybe three nights.' NARRATOR: But Washington and its allies were badlysurprised.Gen.
SHORT: As the conflict progressed, itwas very clear this wasn't going to be a three-night war, that Milosevic wasdigging in. He didn't believe NATO had resolve for the long term.NARRATOR: NATO's gamble failed. When the bombingbegan, the Serbs accelerated a violent campaign of ethnic cleansing. Kosovo wasbeing emptied of ethnic Albanians. The very people NATO had gone to war toprotect were streaming out of the province.And then other alarming images, pictures of a downed Stealthfighter and three American POWs, images that brought home the unwelcome reality.America and its NATO allies had stumbled into a real war, a war they could notlose.IVO DAALDER, NSC Dir. European Affairs ('95-'97):Politically, we can't lose the war. Militarily, we can't lose this war.Strategically, we can't lose this war.
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If we lose this war, NATO is ended, thecredibility of American foreign policy is at an end.NARRATOR: It seems inconceivable that the outcomecould have ever been in doubt. The war in Europe was a contest between theworld's mightiest military alliance and the tiny, over-matched army of a Balkandictator.But this was a war that would be fought by committee.Political considerations in Washington and among its European allies would setthe terms.
Ground troops were off the table. This war would have to be foughtfrom the air alone.
And even, then there was a battle between the generals andthe politicians over how hard to hit Milosevic. The allied air commander wantedto take the war straight to Milosevic in Belgrade, hitting with savageintensity.Gen. SHORT, Allied Air Force Cmdr.: Youwant to crush the enemy. To use a phrase I've used before, you go after thehead of the snake. You put a dagger in the heart of the adversary, and youbring- you bring to bear all the force that you have at your command.NARRATOR: But there was a political problem with that.Scenes of a European capital in flames were more than some of the Europeanallies could stomach.Dr. JAVIER SOLANA, NATO Secretary General ('95-'99):Belgrade is a city of Europe, and you cannot launch a- you know, a militarycampaign without the support and the understanding of the people that supportthe governments who take that decision.Gen. WESLEY CLARK, Supreme Allied Cmdr.
NATO: InEurope, there's a terrible aftermath of World War II, and nations andindividuals have memories of the terror of bombing and what it does to civilianpopulations. And I think European leaders were acutely aware of the sensitivityof their publics, their electorate, their leaderships, to the dangers ofunrestricted aerial warfare.NARRATOR: Nevertheless, with the war going badly,Clark desperately wanted to step up the pressure on Milosevic.
He asked hisboss, German General Klaus Naumann, for permission.Gen. KLAUS NAUMANN, Former Chairman, NATO MilitaryCommittee: General Clark asked us to authorize a strike against the policeheadquarters and the Ministry of the Interior in downtown Belgrade. When we sawthat some 500 or 600 meters away from the Serb Ministry of the Interior there'sa hospital in Belgrade. And when we saw this, I said, 'If we hit by sheeraccident this hospital, then the war is over.' NARRATOR: On April 3, NATO bombers loaded up for a runon Belgrade after winning the reluctant approval of NATO's politicians. NATO'shigh-tech precision bombs struck with devastating accuracy. But at NATO, thevivid results of the military success only served to intensify the politicalworries within the coalition.
So the politicians now insisted on approval andveto power over what targets the allied bombers could hit.Gen. SHORT: There were numerous occasionswhere airplanes were airborne, and the senior national rep would run in to meand say, 'Our parliament won't allow us to strike that target,' or 'Ourauthorities will not allow your airplanes, which took off from our soil, tostrike that target.' NARRATOR: This was consensus warfare. Alliance unitywas paramount to NATO's supreme commander, Wes Clark.Gen. WESLEY CLARK: From the outset, we were trying tostructure a military campaign that met the political requirements. No singletarget, no set of targets, no bombing series was more important than maintainingthe consensus of NATO.NARRATOR: So now bombing downtown Belgrade was out.What the politicians were focused on was Kosovo and the possibility that NATO'swar had exacerbated the horrific refugee crisis that was unfoldingthere.WILLIAM FILLMAN, NATO Intelligence Chief: The Serbforces had really begun their operation against the Kosovar Albanians acrossKosovo.
We saw these large-scale operations now going on against the civilpopulace, with the police, but also now with army forces veryinvolved.NARRATOR: One Serb soldier described the methodicalprecision of ethnic cleansing.SERB SOLDIER: through interpreter There wasa system that was applied throughout all the Yugoslavian wars. You wouldsurround the village on three sides, and the fourth would be left for thecivilians to run out of, so they had the opportunity of leaving the village.When a young Albanian was caught, it was assumed he was KLA. He'd be taken awayand questioned, and afterwards he'd be shot. The questioning was aformality.NARRATOR: Wes Clark was pressed into service for amedia show-and-tell.Gen. WESLEY CLARK: press briefing You cansee the houses without any roofs all over town.
This is a symptom of the ethniccleansing- going in, throwing a grenade, starting a fire, turning on the gasbefore the grenade's thrown, and it blows the roof off.Gen. KLAUS NAUMANN, Former Chairman, NATO MilitaryCommittee: I think the ethnic cleansing and the expulsion was not triggeredby NATO.
It may have been accelerated by NATO. And definitely, some of theatrocities which happened I think were caused by NATO bombs.
And this wassimply this vendetta feeling which is pervading in the Balkans anyway. And theysaw that their compatriots were bombed. They saw that Belgrade was bombed. Sothey took revenge with these people who could not defend themselves.NARRATOR: NATO's political leaders wanted theirgenerals to stop the ethnic cleansing.JAVIER SOLANA: I did feel to a certain extentresponsible also because I was a member of the European Community, and that wastaking place in front of our eyes, in Europe, things that my generation thoughtnever again would see that.Gen. WESLEY CLARK: It was very important politically.It was very important militarily.
These forces, after all, were the- they werethe cause of the problem. They were the agent of the ethnic cleansing. Theywere the support for the ethnic cleansing.NARRATOR: So the military had its orders. It was tofight in Kosovo without ground troops and from the relative safety of threemiles up.Gen. SHORT: Fifteen thousand feet was goingto be the floor because that kept us up out of the small arms environment. Itkept us out of the shoulder-held Stinger SA7 kind of environment.NARRATOR: Even for the greatest military force ever,it was a mission that would prove almost impossible. This is what the alliedfliers were asked to do.
Without troops on the ground to find the Serbs,forward air spotters had to direct bombers to their targets.Maj. THOMAS FELDHAUSEN, Forward Air Controller, USAF:I said, 'Okay, let's imagine you're in a car.'
And I'm telling this on theradio. 'I want you to drive the car up until you get to the warehouse that'sgreen on the left, and I want you to turn left there. I want you to go downthat road until you see the fork.' And he's telling me all the time on theradio, 'Yeah, I see that. Yeah, I see that.' Squadron Leader CHRIS HUCKSTEP, Royal Air Force: Foundthe target, happy with that. I can see the little tiny vehicles that we'retalking about.
And then just I round out around to set up for the attack, theAmerican calls. You know, 'Hold it!' Or words to that effect. 'There's acivilian bus has pulled up next to them.'
THOMAS FELDHAUSEN: Air power can do an awful lot,but it's never going to stop the ability of a guy on the ground of taking a canof gasoline and a match and lighting a house on fire or lining a group ofcivilians up against a wall and shooting them.Gen. KLAUS NAUMANN: I said it's- I think on two orthree occasions in the Council that they are asking for the impossible.
Theywant us to stop the- let's say the individual murderer going with his knife fromvillage to village and carving up some Kosovars. That you cannot do from theair. You cannot hit this guy.
You have to be in to stop it.NARRATOR: The generals believed that deciding to fightthis kind of war, chasing tanks in Kosovo, took the pressure off ofMilosevic.Gen. SHORT: I believe there was a greatsigh of relief in Belgrade. I just didn't think it was the way to use myassets, and I didn't think it was going to get us to where we wanted to get to,which is to have Milosevic modify his activity and stop ethniccleansing.NARRATOR: And NATO had unintentionally given Milosevica tactical battlefield advantage.Group Capt. ANDRE DEZONIE, Royal Air Force: The Serbshad put their forces in villages, under bridges, in towns, anywhere near humanrefugee-type habitation, so it would make it difficult for us to go and attackthem. Anywhere the refugees could be, they put forces and hide them away. Sothe first- the problem was finding them, first of all, and then the second thingis making sure there are no refugees around.
And if there's any doubt, therewas no doubt. www.pbs.org: Read NATO pilots' warstoriesNARRATOR: General Short thought this approach waswasteful and potentially dangerous.Gen. SHORT: We felt that we were going tospend a lot of assets to get minimum return. It was going to take a lot ofsorties to kill a tank, and there was enormous risk of hitting the wrong targetbecause we knew refugees would be moving around in this ethnic cleansingenvironment.NARRATOR: On April 14th, in Kosovo, NATO fliers spiedwhat they thought was a prime target, a Serb military convoy they were clearedto attack. It was not a Serb military convoy, but rather Albanian Kosovarsfleeing in wagons pulled by tractors.1st REFUGEE: through interpreter When wewere approximately 200 meters from the Bistrazin bridge - more or less thatdistance - our tractor was attacked.
We were all watching as the bombs wentoff- so many people, all packed together. Then the noise hit me. It threw me15 meters into the air.NARRATOR: More than 60 Kosovars reportedlydied.2nd REFUGEE: through interpreter When Iwent, what could I see? The women who'd fallen from the tractors were crushedunderneath on the asphalt. Flames everywhere.
My granddaughter was lying onthe ground, hardly alive. She was taken to hospital, but she died the samenight. My youngest daughter had had her neck completely blown away.
Only herbody, you know? I didn't know if it was my daughter. I could only tell by herclothes.
Then I turned around and searched to see my brother-in-law's family.Some had no legs. My brother-in-law, the same. My husband, onlyclothes.NARRATOR: Reports of the tragedy reached NATOheadquarters. But for days they denied it.NATO SPOKESMAN: press conference We aresatisfied that we struck military targets. If we have further information,we'll share it with you, but we cannot give you information that we do nothave.Gen. WESLEY CLARK: What we ended up doing is, over aperiod of four days, we ended up going back to the airmen who flew and takingall the T.V. Footage and all the gunsight imagery, or all of the- throughgunsight video that we had, putting it all together and laying out exactly whathappened.Gen.
SHORT: They saw these vehicles movingfrom house to house, setting houses on fire, and they struck what they thoughtwere trucks. And to be very honest with you, the first time and the second timeI looked at the film, boy, it looked like a truck because here was what lookedlike the cab and the body of a truck. Then when you looked at it a third andfourth time, yeah, it was a tractor pulling a wagon.NATO SPOKESMAN: press conference It appearspossible the vehicles are tractors.
As I reviewed the tapes with the pilots,they agreed. However, they were emphatic that from the attack altitude, to thenaked eye they appeared to be military vehicles.NARRATOR: So General Short asked his pilots to go backto the drawing board.Gen. SHORT: They came back to me and said,'We need to let the forward air controllers go down to 5,000 feet.' 'Weneed to let the strikers go down as low as 8,000 feet in a diving delivery toensure that they verify their target, and then right back up again to 15,000feet. We think that'll get it done.' We acknowledged that that increases therisks significantly, but none of us want to hit a tractor, a tractor full ofrefugees again.
We can't stand that.NARRATOR: The bombing of the convoy made clear theinescapable truth. This NATO mission was not succeeding. Milosevic was not inretreat. Ethnic cleansing was unabated. And NATO's air strategy was resultingin dead Kosovars.As NATO leaders came to Washington for its 50th anniversary,an unimaginable possibility hung in the air. Could NATO actually lose this war?It was a question that had been worrying British Prime Minister Tony Blair forweeks.TONY BLAIR, Prime Minister, U.K.: Milosevic had toknow that we were prepared to do whatever it took to win. I mean, as I used tosay throughout to people, what's the bottom line here?
And the bottom line forme was we can't lose this.NARRATOR: So the evening before the summit, Blair hada private dinner at the White House. He was determined to revive the groundtroop option, but he knew that his closest ally, President Clinton, would haveto be convinced.IVO DAALDER, NSC Dir. European Affairs ('95-'97):Blair comes to Washington a day early for the NATO summit and talks to thepresident in a very small group, and with one mission.
Game or Patch Questions? VisitMAINN E T W O R KFrontline AttackWar over EuropeSystemLanguageProtectionCD Cover: PC:: (v4.82.01) /:Index.Localized Game Names. Frontline Attack: War over Europe.
WWII: Panzer Claws 2Related FileForums Posts.Related Games.Backup & Installation Notes. Always make a backup of the files that are overwritten by the File Archive, as the original files are usually required to update the game to a newer version or to play Online!. Some No-CD/Fixed EXE files work fine in Single Player mode but are detected to be modified when trying to play online. When this happens use the original EXE to play online, else you could find yourself banned from the game!. When using Fixed Files make sure to use a Firewall which controls outgoing traffic, as some games call back to report the use of these modified files!. Some original games do not work when a certain application has been installed, like DAEMON Tools. In most cases using a No-CD or Fixed EXE will solve this problem!.
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